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Xov.l TuPPER v. SurERIOR CouRT 
(51 C.2d 263; :131 P.2d 9771 
2G3 
H is further adjudged that all acts taken in such action 
the Houorable John A. J:Iewicker subsequent to Friday, 
16, I 9i58, are declared null, void and of no effect. 
Gibson, C .• T., Carter, J Traynor, ,T., and Sehaucr, ,J., 
concurred. 
I<'. Xo. 19978. In Bank. )Jov. 21, 1958.] 
JA~H<}S W. 'l'TTPPBH, Petitioner, v. SUPBlUOR COUR'l' 
OP MARIN COrN'rY, Respondent. 
[1] Prohiilitlon-Employment in Criminal Proceedings-Prelimi-
nary Hearing.-Prohibition does not lie to review rulings of the 
oll admi~:sibility of evidence at a prdiminary hear-
iug- unless the cmmnitmeut is based entirely on incompetent 
eYidence. 
[2a, 2b] Id.-Pi'Gsnmptions.-In a proeeeding in prohibition to re-
strain the ~uperior court from proeeediug to trial on an infor-
mation charging petitioner with being an acceo8ory to a felony 
(Pen. Code, § 32), n[tcr the committing mngistrate refused, 
at the pn•limiuary pxamination, to allow dPfcndant to see 
written statemm1t,; of two ;juvetlile witnesses eoucerning their 
respedin~ role~ in t!tP theft ol' hub Ntps from a parked car 
und in uhtaining- from deft>ndaut, a elm·k in :m automobile 
supply ;;ton•. a n•<·cipt indicating that one of the boys had 
purchased the 1JUb caps Jrom the ~ton•, it will he presumed 
that the snpcrio;· court \Yill not erroneouc:ly deny defendant 
opportunity to see the statemcnb at the time of trial and that 
the.v will tlH•re !'oro he avnilable to him for impettchment pur-
poses at that time. 
[3] !d.-Employment in C!imimJ Proceedings-Preliminary Hear-
ing.-\Vhc>re the committing magi~trate had jurisdiction ovee 
both the erime nnd the JWr~on of defendant and there was 
sub;tantial evidenec to support the magistrate's finding that 
tlwre wns prohahle euuso to belien• dPfendnnt guilty of the 
oiiense with \':hieh he 1vns dwr:;ed, prohibition does not lie to 
review the of the mngisirate on a procedural matter, 
the •·mumilliiCllt not being based entirely on incompetent 
evid('Jl('P. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Prohibition, 8 GG; Am.Jur., Prohibition, § 22. 
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that the superior court will 
defendant the opportunity to see the wit-
nessPs statements at the time of trial (llhtchell v. Superior 
) . 
) , or on proper motion before trial 
48 Cal.2d 704, 707 709 [312 P.2d 
[3] the rules to the facts in the present 
case, it is evident that the committing magistrate had juris-
diction over both the crime and the person of defendant. It is 
likewise apparent that there was substantial evidence to 
support the committing magistrate's finding that there was 
cause to believe defendant was guilty of the offense 
·with which he was chargPd. Therefore, under rule 1, supra, 
since the commitment was not based entirely on incompetent 
the writ of prohibition does not lie to review the 
ruling of the magistrate on a procedural matter. 
[2b] The value to defendant of seeing the statements made 
by the witnesses is that to do so might enable him to impeach 
their testimony at the trial. However, under rule 2, supra, it 
will be presumed that the superior court will not erroneously 
deny defendant the opportunity to see the statements at the 
time of trial and that they will therefore be available to him 
for impeachment purposes at that time. Consequently, de-
fendant has failed to show any reason for the issuance of a 
writ of prohibition. 
The alternative writ is discharged, and the peremptory writ 
is denied. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
Schauer, J., concurred in the judgment. 
CARTEH, J., Concurring aud Dissenting.-I agree with the 
majority that petitiouer 's commitment is not based on in-
competent cvidcuec and under the rule announced in Rogers 
Court, 46 Cal.2d 3, 7 [2Dl P.2d 929], prohibition 
is not an available remedy. (Sec Mitchell v. Superior Court, 
50 Cal.2d 827, 829 [ 330 P.2d 48 J.) However, I cannot 
assent to the implitatiou contaiued in the majority opinion 
that petitioner is not now entitled to auy relief. An examina-
tion of the uncontroverted facts convinces me that petitioner 
266 TuPPER 1'. SuPEHIOH Couwr [ 31 C.2(1 
is immediately entitled to the production of tllc written state-
ments of the two witnesses now in the hands of publie officials. 
Sueh relief may be granted by treating the present application 
as a petition for writ of mandate. 
Although petitioner has asked only for prohibition to stay 
further proceedings, where the facts developed upon a hearing 
show that petitioner ic; entitled to some other relief, but nndee 
a different form of writ, this court has authority to grant any 
appropriate relief within the issues presented by the pleadings. 
(Board of 'Trustees v. State Bd. of Equalizahon, 1 Cal.2cl 
784, 787 [37 P.2d 84, 96 A.L.H. 775]; Caminctti v. Superior 
Court, 16 Cal.2d 838, 848 [108 P.2d 911]; Yerdier v. Superior 
Court, 88 Cal.App.2d 527, 531 [199 P.2d 325] ; Simmons v. 
Superior Court, 96 Cal.App.2d 119, 133 [214 P.2d 844, 19 
A.L.R.2d 288] .) This authority clearly extends to issuing 
mandamus where warranted. (Powell v. S1tperior Cond, 48 
Cal.2d 704, 708 [312 P.2d 698] .) 
A writ of mandate will issue where it is shown that the 
court has violated a clear and present beneficial right of the 
petitioner. (May v. Board of Directors, 34 Cal.2d 125, 138 
[208 P.2d 661]; Williams v. Stockton, 195 CaL 743 [235 P. 
986] ; McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Court, 26 Cal.2d 
386, 394 [159 P.2d 944] ; Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal.2d 
559, 561 [212 P.2d 878].) The existence of another equally 
adequate legal remedy docs not require us to dismiss the 
present proceedings. 'Where, as here, the District Court of 
Appeal has issued alternative writs, determined the matter 
on the merits and granted a peremptory writ of prohibition, 
the principle of economy, both as to time and expense, justi .. 
fics our accepting the District Court's decision that there was 
no other adequate remedy at law. (See Bmclrg v. Superior 
Court, 44 Ca1.2d 574, 582 [283 P.2d 704]; Atkinson v. Supe .. 
rior Cmtrt, 49 Cal.2d 338, 342 [316 P.2d 960] .) ]1-,or this 
reason it is unnecessary to consider the effect of petitioner's 
failure to apply for relief in the superior court. 
At the trial stage in a criminal prosecution a defendant 
has a right to compel the production of documents in the 
p!'Oseeutor 's possession. (People v. Riser, 47 Cal.2d 566, 587 
[:\05 P.2d 1].J 'l'o establish this right there must be a request 
for specific documents, it must be shown that the demand is 
not for the purpose of a ''fishing expedition'' on the chance 
something impeaching might turn up, anc1 there must be good 
reason to believe that the document when produced ·would be 
admissible in evidence for some purpose. (People v. Riser, 
Nov.1958] TUPPER v. SUPERIOR COURT 
[51 C.2d 263; 331 P.2d 9771 
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supra, 47 Cal.2d at 587.) However, it is not a prerequisite 
to establishing this right to show a conflict between the wit-
nesses to be impeached and the written statements, because 
it would be impossible to determine whether there was good 
reason to believe the document was admissible without having 
seen it. The chance that it might eventually turn out to be 
inadmissible should not block production at the threshold. 
(Peoplf v. Riser, supra, 47 Cal.2d at 587.) In other words 
defendant's right to compel production of the document can-
not he defeated by arguing that it would be inadmisBible, since 
the question of admissibility is reserved until the document 
is inspected. 
J'ustifieat iou for affording defendant sueh a right is ex-
plained by the true purpose of a eriminal trial, the ascertain-
ment of faet,;. The state':;; interest and goal in criminal 
prosecutions is not to secure a eonviction in every ease by any 
expedient means however odious, but rather only through 
establishing the truth upon a public trial fair to defendant 
and state alike. (People v. R1:ser, supra, 47 Cal.2d at 585; 
Powell v. Superior Court, supra, 48 Cal.2d at 707; see J enck.s 
v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 667-668 [77 S.Ct. 1007, 1 L.Ed. 
2d 1103).) 
\Vhere, however, pretrial produetion of documents is sought, 
the ea:;;es hold, although it is not entirely dear, that pretrial 
inspection and produetion is a question addressed to the 
sound disr:retion of the trial eourt. (Prnu;/1 v. Superior Court, 
supra, 48 Ca1.2d 704; see Walker v. Su.periur Court. 155 Cal. 
App.2(! ]:3-J- j>l17 P.2t1 1:30]; Cordry v. Superior Court. lGl 
Cal.App.2d 267 [326 P.2d 222]; Castiel v. Superior Cmt1·t 
162 Cal.App.2d 710, 711 j:128 P.2d 476j. This din'rsity of 
treatment in compelling the production of documents between 
the trial and pretrial stages is erroneous. An examination of 
the reasons for treating a request for documents at the trial 
stage as a right and the samr requrst at the pretrial stage 
as a matter of discretion, reveals that the problem in each 
instanee is identical as is the rationale. Since there appears 
to be 110 reason for this difference, we may conclude that a 
defendant is entitled as a matter of right to compel the 
production of doeuments at the pretrial stages. To establish 
this right the defendant will be governed by the same princi-
ples as at the trial stages. 
A reYiew of the cases ordering pt·t>trial llistlosurc substanti-
ates this conclusion. 
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In Powell v. Superior sttpra, this court stated that 
a motion for pretrial of certain written statements 
made by the petitioner was addressed to the sound discretion 
of the court. In concluding there was an abuse of discretion 
the court reasoned that to the aeeused of his 
where he has \Yhat he with 
that the statements may be to refresh 
his recollection would be to Jose of 
ascertainment of the facts a trial fair to defend-
ant and state alike. 
'fhe District Court of Appeal in W olker v. 
supra, issued a writ of mandate to 
of a state crime laboratory report concerning the aecused 's 
shoes. It was conceded that the report itself was not evidence, 
but where petitioner alleged that the prosecution will con-
tend the deceased's death resulted from kicked peti-
tioner and that the only source of information from which the 
defense could discover what evidence the shoes provided is the 
report, the trial court, in the interest of should order 
that a copy be provided for the accused. 
On facts similar to the Powell case, mandamus was issued in 
Cordry v. Superior Court, supra, where defendant alleged 
that he could not recollect the content of his statements. In 
Costiel v. Superior Court, stlpro, mandamus was issued to 
vindicate petitioner's previously established judicial right 
to the name of the informer, which was information essential 
to the preparation of an adequate defense. 
In every case in which pretrial production was the 
request was made in order to better prepare a defense. This 
is the reason for the request at the trial level. \\There the 
pretrial request is granted, it is on the theory that the purpose 
of a criminal prosecution is the ascertainment of the facts 
in the process of conducting an equally fair trial. As has 
already been noted this is the same rationale for compelling 
production at the trial stage. \\There the same relief is 
sought for the same reasons there is no reason for diverse 
treatment. 
It has sometimes been hinted that the pretrial production 
of written statements should be in the discretion of the trial 
court because it might hamper law enforeement v. 
Superior Conrt, supra, 48 Cal.2d at 708) and it wonid create 
an imbalanee between the of and 
defense as well as enable the defendant to secure perjured 
and fabricated evidence to meet the state's case 
v. Riser·, supra, 47 Cal.2d at 585). 
that law enforcement might be hampered has 
no here since i here is no claim that such would be 
the 0ffeet. Moreove1·, no daim is made that these statements 
eonlldentia1 or 
California and federal cases the that 
disclosure ·would create an hnbalanee 
the defense with too great an advantage. This is 
that the state's interest and goal in criminal prose-
cutions is not eonvictions but the establishment of truth in a 
trial fair to defendant and state alike. (Powell v. Superior 
supra, 4.8 Ca1.2d at 707; .Jencks v. United States, 
supra, c\5~~ U.S. at 6G7-668; see v. Riser, supra, 47 Cal. 
2d at 585.) 
The concern about possible fabrication of evidence 
and testimony if pretrial production is permitted is 
unnecessary and unwarranted. If a defendant is indicted, he 
must be provided with a transcript of the evidence taken by 
the grand jury. Code, § 925.) If he is charged by 
information, he has a pre1iminary hearing at which prosecu-
tion witnesses testify. In either circumstance the accused has 
at his disposal suffic,ient information from which he can predi-
cate an informed guess as to the prosecution's theory of guilt. 
If sueh comprehensive information is available to an accused 
prior to trial he has all he needs on which to base fabricated 
evidence or testimony if he desires. To compel 
disclosure of other information, which would be admissible, 
can scarcely be said to constitute any appreciable increase in 
this danger. 
Petitioner herein was denied pretrial production of the 
written statements of two key prosecution witnesses. He 
has established his right to compel produetion by requesting 
specific statements, by showing he was not intent on a "fishing 
expedition" and by alleging with particularity that the state-
ments are for impeachment purposes and hence production is 
necessary to determine admissibility. 
'l'he need for the written statements to insure the ascertain-
ment o!' the facts in a trial fair to defendant and state alike 
is obvious. In preparing any defense considerable attention 
is given to cross-rxamination. Since cross-examination has 
been described as the foremost leg·al engine ever invented for 
discovering the truth (5 "Wigmore, Evidence, § 1367), the 
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time eonsumed t lH'rehy i:,; well spent and the :,;tate's interest 
in ascertaining truth is also vindieated. Chw aspeet of cross-
examination is to produee or extraet faets whieh diminish the 
personal trustworthiness of the ·witness. ( 5 \Vigmore, Bvi-
denee, § 1368.) Included as a method of diminishing trust-
worthiness is impeaehment, and therefore, it too is a necessary 
part of preparing a defensl'. Thus, as a matter pertaining 
to the defense, petitioner is entitled to compel production of 
the documents for his use in cross-examining the witnesses on 
the substanee of their previous statements. 
For the foregoing reasons this court should issue a writ of 
mandate ordering the produetion of the written statements for 
defendant's inspection. 
[L. A. Xo. 25138. In Bank. .i\ov. 25, 1958.] 
JAMES IRIAR'l', Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SOUTHWEST 
FEH'l'ILIZEH A:t\D CHRMICAL COMPANY (a Part-
nership) et al., Defendants and Appellants; B. F. 
KNAPP et al., Interveners and Appellants. 
[1] Chattel Mortgages- Extinguishment of Lien- Removal of 
Crop.-Creditors of a grower-lessee holding a mortgage on a 
cotton crop lost the security of their crop mortgage when they 
eonsente,} to the harvesting, removal and sale of the crop by 
the mortgagor. ( Civ. Code, § 2972.) 
[2] Assignments-Equitable Assignments.-Evidencc of an equi-
table assignment must be elcar and specific; the assignor must 
not rdain any control over the fund or any authority to collect. 
[3] !d.-Equitable Assigmneuts.-In an action to determine prior-
ity in the proe<,eds of a cotton crop sold by a gin company, 
in which plaintiff claimed title as lessor to a designated per-
centage of the crop as rent and defendants claimed title as 
attaching creditors of the grower-lessee, and in which the 
holders of a crop mortgage lien intervened claiming priority, 
the evidence would not support a finding of an equitable as-
signment of the proceeds to the holders of the mortgage lien 
or that such proceeds were held in trust for them by the gin 
company and as such were not subject to attachment, where 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Chattel Mortgages, § 72. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Assignments, § 3; Am.Jur., Assignments, § 3. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Chattel Mortgag·cs, § 66; [2, 3] As-
signments, § 27; [ 4, 5] Crops, § 15. 
